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rivalry with Spencer Roane. A careful biography of Roane-whom hero-
worshipping Beveridge treats unfairly-might cast much needed light into
dark corners of Marshall's career.
So, too, might a conscientious probing of the Fairfax lands uncover some
of the motivations of John Marshall. Historians and biographers have glossed
over Marshall's activities as a land speculator. They have ignored the impli-
cations for Marshall of the Fletcher v. Peck decision, and the far-reaching
consequences of the decision's condonation of corruption.
Finally, Marshall's influence in the Virginia Constitutional Convention
of 1829-30 warrants, perhaps, further study. The center of dramatic interest
in that Convention, whose members were as distinguished as Philadelphia's
fifty-five, featured a sectional conflict between an allegedly "democratic"
West and a "conservative" tidewater, and involved the emotion-laden issue
of slavery. Marshall, along with many a Jeff ersonian and Jacksonian "Demo-
cat," voted with the tidewater. Moreover, the Chief Justice headed the com-
mittee on the judiciary-and the new constitution perpetuated the county
court system of the old days! A fresh investigation of this Convention might,
conceivably, reveal that the slavery issue was as phony then as it frequently was
in later years. Perhaps, indeed, Marshall and Jefferson and Roane had all
along been only shadow-boxing with the wordy theories of government and
the real issue involved a struggle for power over a court-centered political
machine.
Whether or not fresh investigations would substantiate these speculations,
the existing gaps in the evidence indicate clearly that the story of John
Marshall is not yet ready for the popularizer's facile hand. If Mr. Loth's
book, by its very inadequacies, can call attention to the lacunae and send new
researchers into the documents, it might perform a real service.
WILLIAm B. HESSELTINEf
THE CONSTITUTION AND SocIo-ECONOMIC CHANGE. By Henry Rott-
schaefer. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1948. Pp. xvi, 253.
$3.50.
These are the five Thomas M. Cooley lectures delivered at the University
of Michigan in March, 1943 by the well-known professor of constitutional
law at the University of Minnesota, author of the text on that subject in the
Hornbook series and accompanying casebook.
The author's stated purpose is to "consider the response of the Supreme
Court to the opportunity presented it when confronted with the constitutional
issues raised by the depression legislation" of the thirties. That purpose has
been well achieved in lawyer-like fashion.
' Professor of History, University of Wisconsin.
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The first lecture or chapter entitled "Development of Federal Powers
Prior to 1933" is devoted almost entirely to the commerce clause. The second
entitled "The Expansion of Federal Powers Since 1933" is also concentrated
largely on the shift of power over commerce from the states to the federal
government, treading the familiar ground of Schechter (1935),1 Jones &
Laughlin (1937) ,2 Mulford v. Smith (1939),' Darby (1941) ,4 Wickard v.
Filburn (1942),' South-Eastern Underwriters (1944)6 and American Power
& Light Company v. Securities and Exchange Commission (1946) .7 It is
pointed out that the commerce power has become "the most important instru-
ment for centralizing control over the national economy in the federal gov-
ernment ;-" that "it will be futile hereafter to frame an argument in terms of
'direct' or 'indirect' effect of local activities upon interstate commerce. The
decisive factor is whether they bear a substantial relation to that commerce
or to a policy which Congress may adopt with respect thereto."' The "com-
merce power was expanded by redefining the major concepts developed in
prior decisions to determine its scope, and by rejecting theories that had
limited its extent by reference to the reserved powers of the states."'10 And
the taxing and spending powers also came to the aid of Congress in control
of the social and economic order in the social security case of C. C. Steward
Machine Company v. Davis (1937)11 which "involves the possibility of federal
control over state policy far more extensive than that possible under the
Estate Tax Act."' 2
If one were hastily to assume that because federal power has been ex-
panded in recent years there has been a corresponding diminution in the
sum total of state powers, he would be mistaken. For in Chapter Three
entitled "The Expansion of State Powers since 1933" Professor Rottschaefer
points out states "may impose some taxes that the commerce clause as con-
strued prior to 1933 prevented them from levying,"" and that since 1933 the
general trend of decisions "has been towards an expansion of state powers
by freeing them of some of the restraints based upon . . . the commerce
clause."' 4 Professor Rottschaefer points out also, however, certain ex-
1. 295 U. S. 495 (1935).
2. 301 U. S. 1 (1937).
3. 307 U. S. 38 (1939).
4. 312 U. S. 100 (1941).
5. 317 U. S. 111 (1942).
6. 322 U. S. 533 (1944).
7. 329 U. S. 90 (1946).
8. P. 82.
9. P. 80.
10. F. 94.
11. 301 U. S. 548 (1937).
12. P. 89.
13. P. 127.
14. P. 134.
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pressions of judicial opinion which might make the commerce power "a most
serious potential threat to the states."'" State power has increased because of
decisions permitting multiple taxation. 16
"The Protection of Personal and Property Rights" is discussed in
Chapter Four. Here are the familiar cases establishing the fact that the due
process clause may protect personal liberties but offers little protection to
rights in property. "The Court has accepted the position of Justice Bran-
deis . . . that the due process clause protects personal liberty more extensively
than rights of property. It has also been intimated by the Court that the
presumption of constitutionality may have a 'narrower scope' of operation
'when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the
Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments' than when applied to
that 'affecting ordinary commercial transactions.' "f7 "The Court has prac-
tically accepted as conclusive of the constitutional issue the legislative judg-
ment that a classification made in legislation for the control of business is
reasonable. This gives the legislature a wide power to affect the competitive
situation by relieving a favored group from burdensome controls imposed on
others in the same field of economic activity."' 8  By the Nebbia case "The
definition of the phrase 'affected with a public interest' is revised out of
existence."'19 "It is questionable whether the due process clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments today interpose any obstacle to legislative
price-fixing. ' 20  Of course "the procedural protection" of the due process
clause "is of no avail when the legislature itself fixes rates or alters prices"
and "there is a definite trend on the part of the courts to accept the fact
findings of administrative agencies and to hold their orders supported by
the record."'" The gold clause cases 22 deprived investors "of a reliable method
for guarding themselves against inflation" and "these decisions and those
dealing with the validity of state moratory legislation 2 have reduced the con-
stitutional protection of contractual rights. Whether they have in actuality
reduced the motive to accumulate capital can probably not be definitely deter-
mined.
24
15. P. 134 citing Northern Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota 322 U. S. 292 at pp. 303, 304
(1944).
16. See for example State Tax Commission of Utah v. Aldrich 316 U. S. 174 (1942);
Graves v. Schmidlapp 315 U. S. 657 (1942); International Harvester Company v. Wis-
consin Department of Taxation 322 U. S. 435 (1944).
17. P. 200.
18. P. 155.
19. P. 159. Nebbia v. People of State of New York 291 U. S. 502 (1934).
20. P. 161.
21. P. 169.
22. Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. 294 U. S. 240 (1935); Perry v. United
States 294 U. S. 330 (1935).
23. Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell 290 U. S. 398 (1934).
24. P. 199.
BOOK RET7IEWS
The title of this book, especially if one thought it was written by a
political scientist rather than a lawyer, might lead one at first to be some-
what disappointed at a legalistic discussion of the cases with little if any
reference to the social, economic, political and philosophical forces affecting
the Court's opinions and determining the trends set forth.25 But the political
scientist who warns his students not to assume that the only changes made
in the Constitution have been by formal amendment, who calls their attention
to changes arising out of custom and the party system, for example, and by
judicial interpretation, may well refer his more mature students to this book.
So also the lawyer whose obligation it is to predict the trend of future decision,
however hazardous in the present era of dissent and reversal, will profit from
a reading of these lectures. Particularly is this true of the last chapter or
lecture, "Some Implications of Recent Trends."
"Since 1933 the Supreme Court has so construed the Constitution as to
sustain a great expansion of federal powers, a relaxation of important limita-
tions on state powers, an acceptance of a more extensive and intensive regula-
tion of business, and an increase in the protection of personal liberty in areas
other than business. It is extremely unlikely that there will be any general
retreat from these positions within any period now foreseeable." 26
The foundation has been laid for regulation of production by the sub-
sidization of those who cooperate with the government in carrying out its
policy, for price control, for the levy of certain kinds of taxes on interstate
shipments, and for the fixing of quotas. "The commerce clause interposes no
obstacle to federal legislation requiring that commodities produced in a
given area be marketed in some other given market area. This could be used
to build up the industries of one section of the country at the expense of
competitors in other sections. . . The recent trend is to deny economic inter-
ests, other than those of labor, any protection whatever under the due process
clause."27 "There would now seem to be no obstacle to limiting production
for the interstate market directly, and likewise production for the 'intrastate
market.' "2, "Congress could require federal incorporation of all corporations
wishing to engage in interstate commerce." 29 Congress also could prohibit
the interstate shipment of the products of new plants, could tax the undis-
tributed profits of businesses whose expansion was to be limited or prevented
and levy a discriminatory tax against new outside investments in such busi-
nesses. And "it has available several instruments for effectively influencing
and controlling the direction of investment in support of any national economic
25. For example, C. HERMAN PRITcHErr, TEE RoosEvELT CoURT, New York, 1948.
26. P. 202.
27. Pp. 206-208.
28. P. 210.
29. P. 225.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
policy that it may validly adopt."' In addition to the commerce power the
taxing and spending powers "have recently been most relied upon by Congress
to achieve social and economic reforms. Both are important instruments for
redistributing wealth and current and future national income."31
An indication of the helpfulness of this book to the practicing lawyer
is to be found in the comment on United States v. Lowden.32 Professor Rott-
schaefer says: "The decision itself would furnish a strong precedent for
holding not violative of due process legislation requiring employers to com-
pensate laid-off or discharged employees by some form of severance pay. It
might even be extended to validate other compulsory payments by employers
to their unorganized or organized employees. . . . This little-known decision
may yet prove one of the most important in the recent line favorable to labor."
Not only the political scientist and the lawyer may profit from this book,
but also the citizen who is concerned about what he calls "free enterprise"
versus planned economy or "socialism" or even the liberal who sees the para-
dox of liberalism: That a movement designed to give social and economic
as well as political freedom may eventuate in a totalitarianism the no less
objectionable or dangerous because it is democratic rather than imposed by a
minority or a fuehrer. As Professor Rottschaefer says, in concluding these
lectures, "The danger that modern liberalism may spawn a tyrannous totali-
tarianism is neither an illusion nor the delusion of 'reactionary thinking.'"'3
The lack of a more sensational title, such as Constitutional Revolution34 or
even The Growth of Constitutional Power in the United States35 and a sober
jurisprudential style free from the rhetoric of explosive epithets should
not deter the thoughtful student of our revolutionary era, lawyer or layman,
from reading this book.
The supreme law that is to emerge from this revolutionary era inevitably
will be profoundly affected if not determined by prevailing philosophical
ideals. Those ideals involve inescapably such age-old questions as: What is
man? What is the purpose of the state? What is the proper relation between
the two? How may liberty and authority best be reconciled at any given time
and place? These questions must be answered if mastery is to take the place
of drift. These questions will not be answered if men are content to live
from day to day by successive temporary expedients for the avoidance of
social friction or of cerebral effort in working through to ultimates. They will
30. Pp. 212-213.
31. P. 176.
32. 308 U. S. 225 (1939).
33. P. 236.
34. EDWARD S. CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, Ltd. Claremont, Calif., 1941.
35. CARL BRENT SWISHER, THE GROWTH OF CONSTITUTIONAL POWER IN THE UNITED
STATES, Chicago, 1946.
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not be answered if men seek salvation in the exclusive worship of a popular
present-day secular trinity: Purely informative education, tolerance and
democracy.
Today many men and women have turned for anchorage in a time of
stress from religion or devotion to the gods of science to public education.
It is assumed that free education for all will give men common goals and a
saving wisdom even though the goals of education are not agreed upon. It is
assumed that if men accumulate enough facts somehow a sound philosophy
will emerge from the pile like some genie from a bottle. Combine education
with unlimited tolerance for any and all ideas however incompatible or false
and with devotion to a vague something called democracy and everything will
come out all right. Do not ask the deeper question, what are the wise and
proper purposes of your democracy; do not suggest limitations on its power
lest you be branded as an enemy of the people. The worship of this trio, edu-
cation, tolerance and democracy, gives men the pleasing sense of having all
the answers, or if not that somehow the answers will come through without
too much trouble. This secular religion encourages drift under an illusion of
progress. Let us hope that it will not be a drift towards totalitarianism, or
better yet that men will realize the need of sound and long-term principles.
Having found them, the climate of opinion in which the Supreme Court works
will be philosophically helpful rather than evasive of fundamental issues or
deleterious.
And whether or not the judiciary, as Jefferson charged, are miners and
sappers of the Constitution, the fact that they work unobtrusively and with-
out the dramatic gesticulations of spotlighted executive and legislature, should
not blind us to the importance of their work. Nor does it free bench and bar,
political scientists and all thoughtful Americans from the duty of constant
scrutiny and constructive criticism of the Supreme Court of the United States
whose members do so much to make the supreme law of the land.
BEN W. PALMERt
THE RATIONAL BASIS OF CONTRACTS AND RELATED PROBLEMS IN LEGAL
ANALYSIS. By Merton Ferson.* Brooklyn: The Foundation Press, Inc.,
1949. Pp. ix, 330. $4.00.
In this volume Dean Ferson has brought together a number of his essays
on the legal analysis of consensual acts. The title of the book might well have
been, "Legal Transactions and Juristic Acts," for those two conceptions pro-
vide the common denominator of the diverse legal problems which the author
t Member of the Minneapolis Bar. D
*Dean Emeritus, College of Law, University of Cincinnati; Visiting Professor,
Vanderbilt University Law School.
